

But the war also made it possible to eliminate the particularities and dissent in the political arena by eliminating Armenians, who could never be part of the new vision since they were not Turks or Muslims, and who, by their political consciousness, were bound to become a permanent source of dissent and discontent, a particularity in a society which was expected to find solace in the Pan-Turanian, Pan-Islamic creeds or in Turkish nationalism rather than in the search for equality, justice, and a dignified human existence. Jemal Pasha, one of the Ittihad triumvirate and Minister of the Navy, conceded a fundamental relationship between the decision to enter the war, domestic policy, and the Armenian "problem":

Of course, it was our hope to free ourselves through the World War from all conventions, which meant so many attacks on our independence. . . . Just as it was our chief aim to annul the capitulations and the Lebanon Statute, so in the matter of Armenian reforms we desired to release ourselves from the agreement which Russian pressure had imposed upon us.⁷²

Jemal certainly did not imply that reforms were not needed, since in these memoirs he confesses having promised Armenians reforms as soon as the war was over, if Armenians functioned as a fifth column in Russian Armenia against Russia.⁷³ In a strange but intriguingly vague style, Jemal stated that "it was an active domestic and foreign policy" that drove the Ittihad to war. The most important domestic problem was the question of the minorities, Jemal asserted, and, among the minorities, the Armenians were the most critical.⁷⁴ Subsequent justifications of the deportations and massacres clarify the meaning of "active" policy. It seems to have been nothing less than the domestic equivalent of war on enemy states.

The desire to proceed with state building unfettered by any external or internal accounting was, according to Jemal, one of the reasons for the Ittihad's decision to enter the war. Of course, as soon as the war started, the two European governors who had just arrived in the country to supervise reforms in Armenian provinces were sent back. But the war allowed the Ittihad to do more. The purpose of the deportations and massacres, wrote the German missionary and eyewitness Johannes Lepsius, "seems to be to drive the idea of reforms out of the Armenians' minds once and for all."⁷⁵ Perhaps this will explain why the murder of the intellectuals took on such a gruesome character. It is said by eyewitnesses that on more than one occasion their skulls were crushed with stones and the brains were thrown to the ground with an invitation to the victim to dare to "think again."

When the news of the deportations and massacres reached Europe, many Turks dissociated themselves from the policies of the Ittihad. Attempting to do so publicly, Mehmet Sherif Pasha, the son of the first

Grand Vizier of the constitutional regime in 1908, described the Armenians as industrious and peaceful people. Attempting to explain the carnage taking place in his homeland, Mehmet Sherif added that "the Armenians' agitation against despotisms in Turkey and Persia [is a quality] one suspects has not endeared them to the autocratic 'reformers' of the Young Turk regime."⁷⁶

GENOCIDE: A RADICAL FORM OF POLITICAL REPRESSION?

The relationship between genocide and domestic change is a theme which precedes the Young Turks in Ottoman history. Evaluating the meaning of the Constitution first introduced by Midhat Pasha under the young Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1876, Harry Luke wrote that, "[Midhat Pasha] was sufficiently shrewd and realistic a statesman to know that only by drastic internal reform, self administered, could the rapidly dissolving Empire stave off the coup de grace which Russia was impatient to administer."⁷⁷ Soon after he felt secure, the Sultan exiled Midhat Pasha and replaced the Constitution with an administration repressive enough to invite a revolution from his most resilient subjects, the Turks. In the introduction to an unsigned study published in 1913, "Turkey: The Situation of Armenians in Turkey Introduced with Documents, 1908-1912," a commentator discussed the repression of the massacres of 1894-1896 in the following way:

The top officials of the old regime were convinced that repression is essential to despotism and reforms are deadly weapons. Seeing the determination of Armenians to obtain reforms and to make their Turkish compatriots companions in their aspirations, they preferred to massacre the Armenians as the ones responsible for the situation, instead of undertaking general reforms which could have brought the end of despotism and their rule.⁷⁸

Given this strong sense of the relationship between repression and wholesale massacre felt by Armenian leaders and nurtured by events, it is not surprising that both major parties as well as conservative leaders could see by 1913 that the Young Turks might be moving in the same direction as the Sultan. "Turkey is promising reforms for European consumption," argued a *Droshak* editorial in June 1913, "but is actually aiming at the destruction of the Armenian element in Anatolia." Only the method would be different from the Hamidian massacres, argued the editorialist.⁷⁹ The Hunchakians thought that the scope would be different too.⁸⁰

They were both correct, although it seems that none wanted to believe that the worst actually could happen. The parties did caution the Armenians not to give any reason for provocations. During the initial stages

of the roundups of leaders, the drafting of young men into the army, the inspections for caches of arms, and other preliminaries to the actual deportations and massacres, Armenians tended to accede to demands, avoided any actions which might have been construed as opposing the state, and hoped that the whole episode would ultimately be forgotten and that the community would survive with minimum damage. Local measures such as the murder of a few hundred intellectuals or a few thousand enlistees were nothing compared to what had been predicted. In most communities where any self-defense was possible the realization that the small incidents were part of the larger event came too late to be of any use. Where communities acted early, such as in Van, Shabin Garahisar, Musa Dagh, and Urfa, the self-defense became part of the justification for the genocide while the genocide was progressing.⁸¹

To complete the preliminary stages of the genocide, the emasculation of the nation without risking much resistance, the planners of the genocide had, in fact, counted on the infinite belief of Armenian leaders in the possibility of political solutions to their problems. Armenians were, after all, students of the Enlightenment and devotees of political discourse once discourse had been made possible by the elevation of the "revolutionary" Young Turks to power. To believe that their colleagues from the days of exile in Europe and from the Ottoman Parliament could in fact use the methods of the Sultan and improve on them was to undermine the basic motivation for their adoption of the best that the West had to offer: belief not only in progress by man but also progress in man, in his perfectibility, in his ability to reason and to do what is reasonable.

When the Young Turks determined to exterminate the Armenians, they were not just ridding themselves of another ethnic group; they were also eliminating the social basis for a substantial change in the regime. They were not guaranteeing just a turkified Turkey, but also a Turkey which was closer to the model of the Empire in its heyday: virile and run by elites who were inspired by ideas beyond the reach of common men and women, particularly those of a lower race and religion, by ideas beyond the reach of discourse, abstracted from reality and, ultimately, from humanity.

The genocide of the Armenian people may be a paradigm for twentieth-century "political" genocides, where the elite's vision was predicated upon the political and sociological dimensions of the society they wanted to rule over. The return to a traditional order where hierarchies are in place and unchallenged may be one such vision. Recent genocides, especially the Indonesian, the Cambodian, and the Ibo, have been more brazenly political in nature, confirming the worst fears that knowledge of evil does not necessarily result in abhorrence of evil; that human reasoning can always find ways to characterize evil as being

something else and to conclude that some societies must be destroyed or must destroy parts of themselves to be saved.

NOTES

The transliteration system used in this text is based on the phonetic values of Western Armenian.

1. The relationship between genocide and modernization has been discussed by George L. Mosse, *German Jews Beyond Judaism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press/Hebrew Union College Press, 1985), with regard to the Jewish holocaust, and by Robert Melson in a recent paper entitled "Neither Scapegoats Nor Provocateurs: A Preface to a Study of Genocide with Special Reference to the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the Holocaust," presented at the Conference on Genocide at Harvard University, April 13, 1985.

2. The best reference work for non-Armenian sources on the Armenian genocide is Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Armenian Holocaust: A Bibliography Relating to the Deportations, Massacres, and Dispersion of the Armenian People, 1915-1923* (Cambridge, Mass.: National Association for Armenian Studies and Research, 1978 and 1980). Other sources include Aram Andonian, *The Memoirs of Naim Bey: Turkish Official Documents Relating to the Deportations and Massacres of Armenians* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920; repr. Armenian Historical Research Association, 1964 and 1965); Dickran H. Boyajian, *Armenia: The Case for a Forgotten Genocide* (Westwood, N.J.: Educational Book Crafters, 1972); Gerard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, *The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistance* (London: Zed Press, 1983); Irving Louis Horowitz, *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980); Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1926; French ed., Paris: Payot et cie., 1919); Martin Niepage, *The Horrors of Aleppo, Seen by a German Eye-witness* (London and New York: Fisher Unwin, 1917 and George H. Doran Co., 1918; repr. New Age Publishers, 1975); Gerard J. Libaridian, ed., *A Crime of Silence: The Genocide of the Armenians. The Permanent People's Tribunal* (London: Zed Press, 1985); Jack Nusan Porter, *Genocide and Human Rights* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982); Yves Ternon, *The Armenians: History of a Genocide* (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1981); Arnold Toynbee, *Armenian Atrocities: The Murder of a Nation* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915; reissued New York: Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic Church of America, 1975); Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Falloden* (London: J. Causton and Sons, 1916).

3. For the early history of the movement, see Ernest E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); for the prewar years see Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).

4. Historic Armenia was divided between the Ottoman and Safavid Persian empires, once in the sixteenth century and finally in the seventeenth century. The eastern, and smaller, part was occupied by Persia until the Russo-Persian war of 1827-1828, when it became part of the Russian Empire. That segment of historic Armenia became independent in 1918 and was sovietized in 1920.

For the social makeup of Western Armenian society, see Gerard J. Libaridian, "The Changing Self-Image of the Armenian in the Ottoman Empire: *Rayahs* and Revolutionaries," in *The Image of the Armenian in History and Literature*, ed. R. G. Hovannisian (Malibu Beach, Calif.: Undena Press, 1981).

5. Because of the presence of the diplomatic corps and an international community, Armenians in the capital were spared deportations, although their leadership there was rounded up and murdered. The regions of Izmir and Adrianople were spared because the chief of the German Military Mission during the war in the Ottoman Empire, General Liman von Sanders, threatened to use force against the Turkish soldiers and gendarmes should they implement the deportation orders. He told his story in Otto Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre in der Türkei* (Berlin: A. Scherl, 1920), and repeated it during his testimony at the trial of Talaat Pasha's self-confessed executor, Soghomon Tehlirian, in Berlin in 1921. See *The Case of Soghomon Tehlirian* (Los Angeles: ARF Varantian Gomideh, 1985), pp. 83-85.

6. The cities and districts which resisted included Van, Musa Dagh, Urfa, Shabin Karahisar, and Hajin. Only the first two were able to survive long enough to receive assistance from the outside and save their people: Armenians in Van were saved by the Armenian volunteers with the Russian army; those in Musa Dagh were rescued by French ships off the coast of the Mediterranean. Resistance in most cases was not undertaken with the hope of ultimate salvation but rather to have a choice in the manner of death.

7. Information on the role of this organization is fragmentary, often from oral history sources. The only substantial research on the subject, done as a doctoral dissertation by Philip Hendrick Stoddard, is silent on the organization's role in Anatolia and the Armenian provinces where the deportations occurred; see Philip Hendrick Stoddard, "The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911-1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teshkilat-i Mahsusa" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1963).

8. Over 4,000 interviews have been taped on cassettes with eyewitnesses and survivors of the Armenian genocide. Significant numbers of interviews have been conducted by Professor V. L. Parseghian (Rensselaer Institute),

Professor Richard G. Hovannisian (University of California at Los Angeles), and their associates as well as by organizations such as the Armenian Library and Museum of America (Belmont, Mass.) and the Armenian Assembly of America (Washington, D.C.). The Armenian Film Foundation of Los Angeles has a collection of filmed interviews with survivors, while the Zoryan Institute for Contemporary Armenian Research and Documentation (Cambridge, Mass.) has over 300 videotaped interviews.

Some press accounts of the deportations and massacres have been republished in *The Armenian Genocide, as Reported in the Australian Press* (Sydney: Armenian National Committee, 1983), *The Canadian Press and the Armenian Genocide* (Montreal: Armenian National Committee, 1985), and Richard Kloian, ed., *The Armenian Genocide: News Accounts from the American Press* (Berkeley, Calif.: Anto Printing, 1985).

9. Cipher telegram, Mahmud Kiamil, Commander of the Third Army to Governors General, July 10, 1915; cited in Gerard J. Libaridian, "The Ideology of the Young Turk Movement," in *A Crime of Silence*, ed. Gerard J. Libaridian (London: Zed Books, 1985), p. 49.

10. See, for example, Yves Temon, "Report on the Genocide," in *A Crime of Silence*, p. 116.

11. The 1894-1896 massacres claimed over 200,000 Armenian victims throughout the Ottoman Empire; for an analysis of the events, see Robert Melson, "A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894-1896," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24, No. 3 (July 1982), pp. 481-509. The 1909 occurrence, known as the massacre of Adana, was in fact a series of massacres in many Cilician cities. It claimed over 20,000 Armenian lives. Coming less than a year after the revolution, the outbreak was embarrassing to the Young Turks trying to project a new image in Europe. The government sent Enver Pasha to participate in joint ceremonies condemning the massacres; see Msgr. Mouchegh, *Les Vêpres Ciliciennes* (Alexandria: Della Rocca, 1909), and the report of an Armenian deputy of the Ottoman Parliament, a member of the Ittihad, Hagop Babigian, *Deghegaker* [Report] (Paris: N.p., 1919).

12. There are no exact numbers or reliable census figures with regard to the various peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Figures proposed by the Armenian Patriarchate or the Turkish census have been challenged on various grounds. Figures used here are on the conservative side. See Hovannisian, *Armenia*, pp. 34-37; Turkish census figures have more recently been used by Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities* (New York: New York University Press, 1983).

13. Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 29-30.

14. This has been the dominant view among Armenian writers for decades. The most widely known works in this category are Haygazn Ghazarian, *Tseghasban Turke* [The Turk, Author of Genocide] (Beirut,

1968), and Zarevant, *Miatsyal ev angakh Turania gam inch ge dsrakren turkere* [United and independent Turanian or what the Turks are planning] (N.p., 1926).

15. The most prominent scholar to advance this view is Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 356. As Robert Melson has pointed out in his recently delivered paper (see note 1), the equation between the nationalism of a Turkish elite with access to resources such as an empire and that of a relatively small and altogether unarmed subject people as the Armenians is not a valid one.

16. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 218-19.

17. The Armenian Question, i.e., the interest which the Great Powers had regarding the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire as part of their imperialistic designs or occasional humanitarian concern should not be equated with the Armenian revolutionary movement, however the two were connected for tactical or strategic considerations. The revolutionary movement involved Armenians in Russia and Persia in addition to those in the Ottoman Empire; it also developed its own dynamics, which included cooperation with non-Armenian and non-Muslim peoples. See Gerard J. Libaridian, "Revolution and Liberation in the 1892 and 1907 Programs of the Dashnaksutiune," in *Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change*, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1983).

18. Tessa Hofmann, "German Eyewitness Reports of the Genocide of the Armenians, 1915-1916," in Libaridian, *A Crime of Silence*, pp. 61-92; Susan K. Blair, "Excuses for Inhumanity: The Official German Response to the 1915 Armenian Genocide," *Armenian Review* 4 (1984), pp. 14-30; Ulrich Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

19. Melson, "Neither Scapegoats Nor Provocateurs."

20. Armenian sympathy for Russia has a long history. In some respects it is the continuation of a medieval belief that Armenians would be freed of the rule of the infidel by a Christian savior; particularly for Armenians in border provinces such as Erzerum and Van, which were constantly ravaged by Ottoman armies during intermittent wars with Russia, and given the inability of the Ottoman government to implement reforms, Russian Armenia seemed a better place to be than Ottoman Armenia. Russia, of course, used these feelings for its own expansionist purposes. But Russia was also concerned that a revolutionary movement among Armenians inspired by the principles of democracy and equality might turn against the Romanov regime, which in fact did occur in 1903 and later, when the tsar's government adopted an assimilationist policy toward Armenians and fomented Armeno-Tatar clashes between 1905 and 1907.

It should also be pointed out that there were large segments of the Armenian population who thought the Ottoman system was preferable to the Russian, since the Ottomans had allowed a *millet* structure to develop, had

given more privileges to the Church, and had not tried to assimilate the Armenians. A debate on this issue raged in the newspapers intermittently.

21. Despite the fact that the genocide of 1915-1916 has a central position in Armenian consciousness and history, there is as yet no comprehensive, systematic history of the genocide.

22. Vahakn N. Dadrian, "A Theoretical Model of Genocide, with Particular Reference to the Armenian Case," *Armenian Review* 2 (1979); idem, "The Structural-Functional Components of Genocide: A Victimology Approach to the Armenian Case," in *Victimology*, vol. 3, and "The Common Features of the Armenian and Jewish Cases of Genocide: A Comparative Victimological Perspective," in *Victimology*, vol. 4, ed. Israel Drapkin and Emilio Viano (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1974 and 1975); idem, "A Typology of Genocide," *International Review of Sociology* 2 (1975).

23. Siyamend Othman, "La participation des kurdes dans les massacres des Arméniens, 1915," *Critique Socialiste* 13 (1982), pp. 31-48.

24. Ronald Suny, "Background to Genocide: New Perspectives on the Armenian Massacres and Deportations of 1915," paper presented at the Conference on Genocide, Harvard University, April 13, 1985.

25. See note 1.

26. Studies of the 1908-1918 period are rare; existing works also have made rare use of existing Armenian sources; historians have functioned under the assumption that Armenians could not have been that important in the minds of the Turkish leaders, even when the issue was the state's attitude toward the Armenians. See, for example, Tarik Z. Tunaya, *Turkiyede Siyasi partiler, 1859-1952* [Political parties in Turkey, 1859-1952] (Istanbul: N.p., 1952).

For brief discussions of this period see Hovannisian, *Armenia*, pp. 28-34, and Mikayel Varantian, *H. H. Dashnaksutian Batmutiun* [History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation], vol. 2 (Cairo: N.p., 1950), pp. 183-235.

27. This agreement has been referred to briefly by Varantian, *ibid.*, pp. 203-4. Members of the Turkish Section of the Dashnaksutiune's Bureau were asked by the Sixth World Congress of the Dashnaksutiune in 1911 to prepare a comprehensive report on the relations between the party and the Ittihad. The resulting study consists of two documents. The first is a diary-like notebook of about forty-six pages with entries on meetings between ARF and CUP leaders between 1909 and 1911 (Archives of the Dashnaksutiune, File 78/a-1). The second is entitled a "Memorandum" on the same issue; the document has forty-six pages (File Number 78/a-2). These archives contain extensive files on the period under study and are certain to yield much critical information once studied. Both documents mentioned here are drafts; it is hoped that further research may unearth the final versions, although drafts often provide clues on difficult points which may be covered in the final draft.

28. Archives of the Dashnaksutiune, File 78/a-1.

29. Simon Zavarian, "Asdijanagan vochnchatsum" [Gradual extermination], *Azadamard*, August 9 and 26, 1911. The article provides statistical evidence of the dramatic decrease in the number of Armenians and Armenian-owned houses, farms, and farm utensils in a number of districts over a period of thirty years.

30. Shamil, to Western and Eastern Bureaus of the Dashnaksutiune, August 10, 1911. Archives of the Dashnaksutiune, File 671, Doc. 46.

31. Archives of the Dashnaksutiune, File 78/a-2. For the last point, see also Jemal Pasha, *The Memoirs of a Statesman* (New York: Dial, 1919), p. 254. Jemal states that the Ittihad asked the Dashnaksutiune to come under the umbrella of the Ittihad as should all other parties. The argument was that there was no need for divisions when everyone was now an Ottoman.

32. Simon Zavarian, "Paregamutian Artunke" [Result of friendship], *Azadamard*, April 19, 1912.

33. Simon Zavarian, "Himnagan vdanke" [The fundamental danger], *Azadamard*, May 17, 1912. The titles indicate either large landownership, other great wealth, or positions of traditional authority.

34. Arsen Gidur, *Batmutiun S. T. Hunchakian gusagtsutian* [History of the Social Democratic Hunchakian Party], vol. 1 (Beirut: N.p., 1962), p. 389.

35. Jemal Pasha, *Memoirs*, p. 256.

36. "Azadakrutian janabarhe" [The path to liberation], unsigned editorial, *Azadamard*, May 18, 1912.

37. Gidur, *Batmutiun S. T. Hunchakian*, p. 365.

38. Unsigned lead article, *Droshak*, June 1912.

39. Hovannisian, *Armenia*, pp. 38-39.

40. The denial/justification pattern was set during the genocide itself and consecrated by none other than Talaat Pasha, the Minister of Interior of the Ittihad most responsible for the holocaust, in his memoirs, "Posthumous Memoirs of Talaat Pasha," *Current History* (November 1921), pp. 287-95.

41. It is difficult to find in Turkish historiography a serious treatment of the history of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. In addition to limitations to archival sources imposed by the Turkish government even to some Turkish historians, the discussion of the genocide is a politically dangerous undertaking, unless one is denying it. To justify silence on the genocide, historians must also remain silent on pre-genocide relations.

42. To prove his humanitarian concerns, Jemal Pasha remembers having argued against deporting and killing all Armenians since these actions would have disastrous effects on the economy, especially the agriculture of Anatolia (*Memoirs*, p. 278). Zavarian had characterized the role of the Armenians in the Empire as "the milking cow" (*Azadamard*, August 5, 1911).

It should be noted that Armenians were involved in the reform movement, although in a different way, in the first constitutional period too, under Midhat Pasha. Krikor Odian, a Paris-trained lawyer who had played a major role in the development of the Armenian "National Constitution" for the *millet* in

1860-1863, was an advisor of Midhat Pasha, and is thought to have been instrumental in the writing of the 1876 Ottoman constitution.

The integration was particularly strong in folk culture, where language and other barriers break down; comparative studies in folk music and dance should be revealing.

43. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds., *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, Volume 1, The Central Lands* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981).

44. Prince Sabaheddine, who was related to the Sultan and whose family went into exile, became one of the leading figures of the Young Turk movement. He became the founder of the Hurriyet ve Ittilaf Firkasi (Freedom and Private Initiative Party), which included Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Arabs, and Bulgarians. See Ahmad, *Young Turks*, p. 99, and Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, pp. 82-83.

45. Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 92.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

47. Ahmad, *Young Turks*, p. 163.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

49. Ramsaur points out that one of the reasons why the Young Turk Damad Mahmud's critique of the Sultan's regime was effective with Turks was that "he was a Turk and a Muslim himself, as well as a member of the royal family" p. 59.

50. *Droshak* (Geneva), October-November 1909; Garo Sasuni, *Kurd azkayin sharzhume ev hay-krdagan haraperutiunnere* [The Kurdish national movement and Armeno-Kurdish relations] (Beirut: Hamazkaine Press, 1969), pp. 155-57.

51. Gidur, *Batmutiun*, p. 319; Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 73.

52. It seems to this writer that had the political, economic, and social reforms supported by Armenian political parties been part of the program of Turkish parties, Turkish historians would have found them relevant for understanding Ottoman history; some of them also might have found echoes in the concerns of more contemporary perspectives.

53. The most readily available studies of the subject are Louise Nalbandian's *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement* (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California, 1967), which covers the early stages of the movement to 1896, and Anaide Ter Minassian, *Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Liberation Movement, 1887-1912* (Cambridge, Mass.: Zoryan Institute, 1984).

54. "Dsra kir" [Program], *Hunchak* (London), October-November 1888; also in Gidur, pp. 32-37.

55. Unsigned editorials, "Heghapokhutian ayp pen kime" [The ABC of the revolution], *Droshak*, November 1893 and January 1984.

56. "Kordsi propagand" [Propaganda for action], *Droshak*, October 1907 and passim.

57. Gidur, *Batmutiun*, p. 323.
58. *Chorrort enthanur zhoghovi voroshumner* [Resolutions of the Fourth World Congress] (Vienna, 1907); unsigned proclamation on the occasion of the Young Turk revolution, *Droshag*, September 1908.
59. The Hunchakian Party and the Dashnaksutiune continue to function to this day; the Ramgavar-Sahmanatragan Party joined with two smaller groups in 1921 to form what has since been the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party.
60. Mosse, *German Jews Beyond Judaism*.
61. H. Elmasian, *Eprem* (Tehran: N.p., 1964), and Andre Amourian, *Heghapokhakan Yepremi Votisagane* [The odyssey of Yeprem the Revolutionary] (Tehran: Alik, 1972).
62. Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 147.
63. Ramsaur recognizes the role of the resentment of European interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire in the beginnings of Turkish nationalism, but he adds, "In their attitude toward the Armenians and other subject peoples, the Young Turks are basically imperialistic" (p. 44).
64. *Droshak*, September 1980.
65. *Droshak*, February-March 1914.
66. Gidur, *Batmutiun*, p. 328.
67. "Kaghakagan hay gusagtsutiunneru hamerashkhutiune. Haydararakir" [The harmonious cooperation of Armenian political parties. Proclamation], October 1913, Constantinople. Archives of the Dashnaksutiune, File 53-179. The document was signed by the Hunchakian Party, the Reformed Hunchakian Party, the Ramgavar-Sahmanatragan Party, and the Dashnaksutiune.
68. *Droshak*, January 1913.
69. Sabaheddine seems to have been impressed by Edmond Demolins, *Anglo-Saxon Superiority: To What It Is Due* (New York: R. F. Fenno & Co., 1889), in which the author argues that patriotism works when it is "founded on the independence of private life" in which the individual will defend his fatherland to protect his own freedom, when the state exists to facilitate the individual's own independence, and when the fatherland is made for man and not the other way around. See Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 82-83.
70. Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 70; see also Gerard J. Libaridian, "Nation and Fatherland in Nineteenth Century Western Armenian Political Thought," *Armenian Review* 3 (1983), and "A Perspective on the Armenian Liberation Movement," paper presented at a University of Michigan conference on new interpretations in Armenian history, Ann Arbor, 1983.
71. Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 8.
72. Jemal Pasha, *Memoirs*, pp. 97, 276.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

75. Johannes Lepsius, *Der Todesgang des armenisches Volkes. Bericht über das Schicksal des armenisches Volkes in der Tünkei während des Weltkrieges* [The deathmarch of the Armenian people. Report on the fate of the Armenian people in Turkey during the World War] (Heidelberg: N.p., 1980), p. 227.

76. *Daily Telegraph*, October 9, 1915.

77. Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 7.

78. *Droshak*, February-March 1913.

79. *Droshak*, June 1913, p. 97.

80. Unsigned editorial, *Hunchak*, November 1913.

81. *Aspirations et agissements revolutionnaires des comités Arméniens avant et après la proclamation de la Constitution Ottomane* (Constantinople: N.p., 1916 and 1917).

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