

become the largest recipient of Soviet economic aid to any Third World country. Further, an economic cooperation pact signed between the two countries in April 1978 was followed by the visit of an official delegation to Turkey led by Marshal N.V. Orgakov, chief of staff of Soviet Armed Forces. The delegation intended to discuss a new nonaggression treaty. (48)

Unusual manifestations of Armenian nationalism are in part reactions against these overtures to the traditional antagonist. In 1965 the official commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Genocide was interrupted by violent outbursts of young demonstrators in Yerevan. They demanded action "to recover their lands" rather than ceremonies to honor the victims. (49) It is probable that the major reason for the removal that year of Y.N. Zarobian as first secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia was his inability to prevent and to deal effectively with these demonstrations. (50)

Subsequently, illegal activities were carried on secretly. In 1969, 1970, and 1973 to 1974 Soviet Armenian courts tried, convicted, and imprisoned a number of activists - grouped under a "National United Party" - for having advocated the idea of a united and independent Armenia and for having formed cells to achieve their goal. (51)

Historically related to the territorial claims against the Republic of Turkey is the issue of Mountainous Karabagh within the USSR. This district remains under the jurisdiction of the Azerbaijani SSR despite a decision in 1920 by the Soviet Azeris to return it to Soviet Armenia. (52) Armenians have consistently charged that the Azerbaijani authorities have pursued a policy of cultural oppression, economic discrimination, and ethnic disadvantages against the overwhelmingly Armenian population of the district. (53) This policy reached such proportions in 1969 that the Soviet Armenian republican leaders reportedly went to Moscow to register their complaint and request the incorporation of the district in the Armenian SSR. The request was denied. (54)

In 1975 many Armenians were ousted from the Party in Karabagh or imprisoned on charges of nationalist agitation contrary to "the principles of Leninist friendship of peoples and proletarian internationalism." (55) Having silenced all local opposition to the status quo, authorities in Karabagh and Azerbaijan declared the issue resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned. (56) These declarations, printed in an official publication and including derogatory statements toward the Armenian SSR, prompted one of Soviet Armenia's most respected novelists, S. Khanzatian, to dispatch a letter of protest and indignation to L.I. Brezhnev. Khanzatian, a member of the Communist Party since 1943, reminded Brezhnev that "nothing hinders the development and strengthening of the solidarity between proletarian classes more than injustice against a people." He reiterated the demand for the return of Karabagh in the name of the same principles that had been called upon to justify the current situation. A commentary that accompanied a copy of the letter to the diasporan press asserted that the systematic

policy of forcing Armenians to leave the region through social, economic, and other forms of oppression is tantamount to genocide according to one definition in the U.N. Convention on Genocide to which the USSR is a signatory. The unknown author further revealed that according to an unofficial survey, Armenians in Karabagh wanted nothing more than to see their land under the jurisdiction of the Armenian SSR. (57)

To achieve a *modus vivendi* between official policy and Armenians' expectations, the Soviet state has relied largely on bureaucratic methods of oppression rather than the massive violence of the past. At times it has even taken conciliatory steps to avoid large-scale, active opposition to the government. Most recently, for example, the draft submitted for final approval of the new Constitution of the Armenian SSR had deleted the provision in the previous law which had recognized Armenian as the official language of the republic. Following demonstrations against a similar proposal in Tbilisi for the Georgian SSR, the government reinstated the language provision in the new version. (58)

The change from Stalinist practices could be ascribed to the Soviet government's expectation that the emerging technological society will induce historical amnesia; or, conceivably, it might stem from calculations that Armenian irredentism against Turkey can be used to legitimize future annexations from that country. The relative leniency might also reflect the price Soviet leaders are willing to pay for the success of their overall policies.

But still the Soviet government has difficulty in determining when nationalism is harmless in extent or form. Hence it has not hesitated to press the full power of the state against such manifestations it considers threatening. There has been a barrage of criticism aimed at Armenian chauvinism, nationalistic tendencies, and disregard for Marxist-Leninist principles in the interpretation of Armenian history. The guardians of the faith have not spared writers and artists who have deviated from the norms of "socialist realism." (59) In addition to those already mentioned, the list of political prisoners included the film director Sergei Paradjanov or Sargis Paradjanian, whose talent has been recognized within and without the Soviet Union. (60) Others have been subjected to varying forms of censorship and silence. The interesting fact regarding this last wave of repression against intellectuals is that the works of these victims have displayed more humanism than nationalism.

It is true, nonetheless, that national aspirations have not retreated since the Revolution; and territorial aspirations formulated at the beginning of the century survive among East Armenians, many of whom trace their roots to historic Armenia outside the boundaries of the present Republic. Moreover, a half-century of oppression and abnegation within the new empire has strengthened that nationalist sentiment. As a consequence, there seems to be a growing cooperation between activists in Armenia and other parts of the Union, especially Russia and the Ukraine; and, at least for some, the national issue has been

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reintegrated within the larger sphere of problems faced by Soviet society. An Armenian samizdat has proliferated in Yerevan and a committee has been formed there to monitor the implementation of the Helsinki accords. (61) In addition, a number of Armenians have been involved in dissident activities in the Soviet Diaspora. (62) Even the National United Party, once an adherent of an exclusive nationalism, has eliminated from its program the strict ideological opposition to communism to pursue its goal of independence within the context of other forms of opposition to the present Soviet state. (63)

Soviet Armenian nationalism embodies, then, an unwillingness to accept the injustices of the past as well as resentment of present oppression. In its extreme form it probably detracts from the ability of its adherents to deal effectively with the challenges of a changing, modernizing society. It remains, nonetheless, less abstract and far less idealized than that among the Diaspora Armenians.

#### Armenians in Turkey: A Silent Minority

An estimated 60,000 Armenians now live in the Republic of Turkey; a majority of these are concentrated in Istanbul. This estimate does not include perhaps an equal number of partially assimilated Armenians in distant provinces who, at best, preserve a blurred sense of their origins through rituals and symbols, since the former Armenian provinces were thoroughly islamicized and turkified during and after the massacres. In central and western Anatolia there are a few recognizable communities of Armenians. Some of these have churches at their disposal; but only three - Iskenderun, Kayseri, and Diyarbakir - have parish priests (all of the Apostolic or Gregorian faith); and the general demographic tendency in these provincial communities has been to move to Istanbul. For most Turkish Armenians, reaching that ancient city remains the only hope against total loss of identity. (64)

The leader of the Turkish Armenians is the Patriarch in Istanbul, even though the Armenians of that city belong to more than one religious denomination. Once all-powerful over the whole Armenian population of the Ottoman empire, the Patriarch is now little more than a local prelate. His duties still include the representation of the interests and needs of the Anatolian flock and, with leaders of smaller Catholic and Protestant communities, the maintenance of various Armenian religious, educational, and charitable institutions. But for some time now his main practical responsibility has been to bring Armenian children from the provinces to Istanbul and to provide them with adequate health care and an education.

Outwardly, harmony reigns between the Armenians of Turkey and the Turks. Ataturk's revolution separated state and religion, and the constitution of the republic explicitly prohibits religious and ethnic discrimination. The mushrooming Turkish middle class is in fact highly secular and assumes a tolerant attitude towards religious minorities.

Archbishop Shnork Kalustian, the Istanbul Patriarch, himself asserts that Armenians enjoy "total freedom of worship" in Turkey. (65) Those who live in Istanbul are involved primarily in trade, industrial production, the liberal professions, and crafts - social areas where secular views are likely to prevail. Although reduced in scope and prestige, the Armenian press and cultural societies continue to provide a forum for cultural activities. Nonetheless, there is strong evidence of both official political and social discrimination against the country's Armenians, and of harassment of their institutions.

This particularly affects the opportunity of Armenians to send their children to community-owned schools. The Turkish Ministry of Education requires that the identity card of an Armenian child bear official recognition of his Armenian origin before he or she is allowed to attend an Armenian school. This is not only contrary to the Turkish constitution, but the office granting these identity cards has in recent years ruled against the use of such notations. As a result, the proper certification is difficult to obtain, and an increasingly large number of Armenian children are forced to attend public schools where they will be denied any instruction in Armenian language, culture, or religion. Comparable vicious circles regarding the issuance of permits necessary for the restoration or relocation of Armenian community buildings exist. (66) Furthermore, there have been arbitrary administrative actions affecting Armenian culture. For example, in the summer of 1977, the newly refurbished Apostolic Church of Kirikhan (Hatay Province) was closed without explanation by order of the Interior Minister who had earlier expropriated property belonging to that community. (67) Often travelers in eastern Turkey have found ancient and medieval monuments of Armenian architecture in a process of decay, at the mercy of the natural elements and marauders, and occasionally subject to willful destruction. (68)

In his most recent annual report the Patriarch disclosed that through unlawful taxation, bureaucratic procrastination, and administrative roadblocks the government was in fact discriminating against Armenian educational and charitable institutions, making it increasingly difficult for Armenians to use and ultimately to sustain them. He suggested that authorities were denying Armenian citizens essential human rights - rights which were routinely granted to noncitizen residents of Turkey - otherwise guaranteed by the Turkish constitution as well as by Articles 37 through 44 of the Treaty of Lausanne. The report concluded:

For the last 10 to 12 years, we have duly reported these restrictions, discriminations and restraints to the respective departments of our State. But we confirm painfully that neither a positive nor a negative reply has been received. This means, that the demands are so well-founded, legal and rational, that nothing can be said against them. Nevertheless, we have never ceased hoping, because in the final resort justice and law shall prevail. (69)

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A former Belgian representative on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has been much less restrained in accusing the Turkish government of systematic discrimination against Armenians. (70)

All this must be supplemented by mention of the social pressures that discourage the use of the Armenian language in public places in Turkey and persuade Armenians who wish recognition and advancement in business and professional circles to adjust their family name endings to Turkish patterns.

Faced with these conditions the Armenians of Turkey abstain consciously and massively from political life, constraining the Patriarch to reaffirm from time to time the total allegiance of his flock to the Turkish fatherland and state. Armenians in Turkey manifest none of the concerns evident elsewhere for the political, territorial, or moral issues emanating from the massacres and deportation of their people during World War I. The fiftieth and sixtieth anniversaries of the Genocide, ostentatiously commemorated in the ASSR and the Diaspora, were ignored by Armenians in Turkey. They are subservient to any and all governments lest any criticism be interpreted as unfaithfulness.

The return to power in June 1977 of Bulent Ecevit's Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or Republican People's Party raised hopes that the most obvious of the transgressions against the rights of Armenian citizens of Turkey would be eliminated. During the electoral campaign Ecevit had charged the neofascist National Action Party with terror against non-Turkish minorities such as Kurds and Armenians. When he took office as prime minister, Ecevit rescinded the order of the previous government to restrict the entry into Turkey of foreigners of Armenian extraction regardless of their citizenship. (71) More importantly, he and other ministers of his cabinet met with Patriarch Kalustian to discuss the legal and bureaucratic difficulties encountered by the Armenian community. Ecevit promised to end bureaucratic abuses and to study cases of legalized discrimination. The meetings took place at the end of March 1978, on the eve of annual commemoration of the Genocide in the Diaspora. This could hardly have been accidental. Ecevit and his colleagues suggested to the Patriarch that their promises hinged on the Patriarch's willingness to convince Armenians in other parts of the world to end anti-Turkish demonstrations, although the Patriarch has no administrative or legal authority outside Turkey. (72) Following the meetings the Patriarch issued an appeal to the Diasporan press inviting Armenians to refrain from political activities related to "past events" and to remember the dead only as a religious and spiritual duty. (73)

Since then the only positive development has been the return of the Kirikhan Church to the local community. On the other hand, a ruling by the ministry of education in December 1977 decreed that private schools, such as those under the jurisdiction of the Armenian Patriarchate, could close only on days officially designated by the government and would have to remain open during the traditional Christmas and Easter holidays. (74) In January 1978, moreover, bombs

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exploded in the Armenian Cathedral of Istanbul, in the chancellory of the Patriarchate, and in one of two Armenian orphanages in the capital. A secret Turkish organization claimed responsibility for the acts that were reportedly undertaken in revenge for similar attacks by Armenian groups against Turkish government offices in Europe. (75)

Armenians in Turkey have been reduced to a cultural group that can no longer acknowledge its own roots. Many find emigration to Europe or North America a better alternative.

#### THE DIASPORA: DILEMMAS AND DANGERS OF LANDLESSNESS

Land has been an essential component of the Armenian ethos. The defense of the motherland provided chroniclers the raw material from which heroes and villains were created. Love of land permeated ancient Armenian mythology as well as the ideologies of the modern era. Yet paradoxically a history of just that land can in no way adequately cover the history of the Armenians. Particularly since the eleventh century, Armenian communities were to be found in places as far off as India and England, Egypt, and Eastern Europe. Frequent domestic and foreign pressures have forced waves of Armenians to seek security and prosperity beyond the boundaries of a homeland that lacked peace and an indigenous government. Starting in the eighteenth century, these communities played a significant role in the transmission of secular and western ideas of the Enlightenment to the Armenian people. Expatriates in Madras, Venice, Constantinople, Moscow, and Tiflis drew the contours of the nineteenth century cultural renaissance. They also played an important political role. Until the nineteenth century, merchants and clergymen in London, Moscow, and Paris contributed to the plans to reestablish an Armenian state and attempted to insure the help of powerful western monarchs for the realization of their endeavors. By the end of the century the ranks of older communities had been swelled and new ones had been developed by the emigration of thousands of West Armenians of humbler origins. When the revolutionary activities erupted in Ottoman Armenia, communities in Egypt, Europe, the United States, and Russia provided essential organizational, logistical, and financial support. During World War I, many from Europe and the United States joined the Allied forces hoping to minimize the extent and effects of the massacres and deportations. (76)

At the present time, as in the past, the Diaspora plays an inordinately important role in the life of the world's Armenians, more than compensating for the withering historical memory of the Armenian community in Turkey. There are presently about 250,000 Armenians in Europe, 450,000 in North America (primarily in the United States), some 100,000 in South America, and about 100,000 in Africa and the Far East. (77) But Diaspora Armenians have long regarded communities in

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the Near and Middle East as the more important because of their compactness, proximity to the historic lands, cultural facilities, and ability to resist assimilation. Close to 200,000 live in an ancient community in Iran. Another 200,000 are in Lebanon, 100,000 in Syria, and a final 100,000 are scattered in Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. Diaspora Armenians are, to a considerable extent, people or the offspring of people who survived the genocide by fleeing to other former parts of the Ottoman Empire. They carry on the impassioned political heritage they brought with them.

Between the two world wars several factors tended to inhibit the emergence of Armenian political activism in the Middle Eastern Diaspora. The most obvious is that as refugees their immediate concern was economic survival. In addition, they were preoccupied with the enormous task of creating, with meager resources, a community infrastructure of schools, churches, and community organizations in an alien environment.

An equally important factor was a matter of administration. The newly mandated Arab states of the 1920s preserved for a while in the sphere of civil law and religious affairs the institutions they inherited from the Ottoman Empire. As a result the Church became the primary forum of social organization as was the case in the Ottoman millet system. In 1921 the Catholicosate of Cilicia was evacuated from Turkey and established in Lebanon. Originally established when the medieval Armenian kingdom had its center in Cilicia, this see had since 1375 lost much of its glamour. But now, with the Soviets in control of the Catholicosate of Edjmiadsin and the Constantinople Patriarch's power limited to Turkey itself, the Catholicos of Cilicia settled in Antelias, a suburb of Beirut, and assumed jurisdiction over Apostolic Armenians in Lebanon, Syria, and Cyprus. By definition and by tradition, the Church has functioned as an agent of "conservation" under circumstances created by nonindigenous forces. Within the conditions of the Diaspora that tradition acquired a new impetus and significance.

Finally, the revolutionary ARF and Hunchakian parties, which had struggled to raise the political consciousness of the Armenian people, had suffered greatly during the disasters of West and East Armenia. For them, the technical task of reorganization in new countries proved much easier than digesting the events and experiences of the past decade. Even then they spent their energy dealing with the immediate problems that the communities faced. In this they were assisted by a reinvigorated third party, the ADL (Ramkavar-Azatakan or Armenian Democratic Liberal Organization). (36) The ADL was founded in the Ottoman Empire in 1908 and reorganized in 1921. Based on upper and middle class elements, it was committed to the free enterprise system and its mission was to offer Armenians an alternative to the revolutionary, socialistic parties. (78) For the ADL the Church was an integral and essential part of Armenian culture. Diaspora conditions favored such an outlook and the ADL soon replaced the Hunchakian Party as the prime adversary of the ARF, which remained the strongest party. Nonetheless, within the Diaspora the ADL strengthened the

inclination toward acceptance of reduced political goals and lowered expectations.

Generally speaking, these interwar arrangements in the Middle Eastern Diaspora provided quasi legal recognition of Armenianness and a form of extraterritorial self-management; at the same time they fostered conservatism and created obstacles to cultural and political integration of the refugees into their new environments. Attachment of the refugees to their old homes and a continuing, pietistic hope of return enhanced the feeling of Armenian separateness and temporariness in the Arab states. But since World War II there have been marked changes in this process of adjustment.

First, the rise of Arab nationalism has provided a sharper focus to the cultural and political identity of peoples in those states. Second, the emergence of statism in the developing societies of the Near East, especially in Syria and Egypt, has changed the relationship between citizen and state. The success of the new state policies has required control and planning in the economy and to some extent in social relations. The impact of these changes on Armenians has been manifold. For some it has meant the loss of prominence in industry, trade, and various professions, and often an end to prosperity. All have been confronted with the need to formulate a more integrative concept of national identity to replace the self-containment of the past; and a problem of assimilation has emerged. The new generations born in the new milieu are far better integrated than their parents could be. Enjoying conditions far less trying, and an environment far more conducive to a normal life than was the fate of the refugees, the Diaspora youth tend to know the local languages and feel more secure in their legal and social standing.

The same factors that provide a degree of permanency have caused a rise in the political consciousness of the youth and in their interests in Armenian affairs. If the passing generation defined its Armenianness within the context of a helpless victim, and remembered longingly but passively the ancestral lands, the new generation tends to come forth as the vindicator and consummates a rediscovered idealism in its role of claimant. The dual phenomena of integration and "activism" have thrust a new life as well as new burdens on the two institutions of leadership - the political parties and the Church.

The process of adjustment by the political parties to new, unfavorable realities started before World War II. The quasi Marxist Hunchakians - the oldest but weakest of the groups - laid aside their erstwhile dreams of territorial grandeur and independence to adopt a sovietized Eastern Armenia as the realization of their program. The liberal ADL also gradually accepted the status quo in Soviet Armenia and professed satisfaction with the technological and cultural progress taking place there, though this policy was adopted largely on pragmatic considerations and could not have emanated from their ideology. (79) The two made a coalition with the small number of Soviet-oriented Armenian communists in the Diaspora to support the USSR's claims



against Turkey at the end of World War II. Further, they believed that the Soviet Union would respond more readily to avowed sympathizers than professed enemies and thus, subsequent to the War, they refrained from any activities that could have jeopardized Soviet goodwill toward Armenians and their claims.

Meanwhile the once socialist ARF, still soured by its experiences with the Soviet state in 1917 to 1921, remained more sensitive to antinationalist elements in Soviet practice and ideology. Hence it continued to insist on a free and united Armenia independent of Soviet influence and Turkish domination. (80) During the hopeful years of 1945 to 1947, nonetheless, the ARF declared that in relation to territorial demands the political question of Armenia's regime was of secondary importance. Along with all other factions, the anti-Soviet organization announced its readiness "to assist the USSR if that country took upon itself the defense of the Armenian Case." (81) But then, during the cold war, the ARF became aggressively anti-Soviet.

The year 1956 turned these differences between the political parties into a deep dissension. In that year the Soviet authorities allowed the election of a new Catholicos to the vacant seat of the see of Edjmiadsin. He proceeded to reassert his authority over other administrative centers of the Apostolic Church as spiritual leader of all Armenians. The same year the see of Cilicia began increasing the number of Diaspora communities under its jurisdiction. Conflict between the two centers developed inevitably. Even though the programs of the political parties demanded dynamic secularization of Armenian values, they could not avoid involvement in the conflict of these traditionalist ethnic and religious centers. The Cilician see came under ARF control. The cause of Edjmiadsin was taken up by the Hunchakian-ADL bloc. Passions came to the surface that are best described as symptomatic of parties in exile. During the 1958 civil war in Lebanon the Armenian community there split asunder. The parties raised cold war banners, supported opposite sides, and conducted their own miniwar against each other.

Since 1960, relations between the opposing factions have improved. The political parties realized that neither the USSR nor the West is as attractive and trustworthy as earlier rhetoric had made them appear. It became clear that the polarization had placed the national leadership, both religious and political, in direct contradicton with their professed concerns for the general welfare of the Armenian people. Irrelevance in the eyes of a new, politically conscious generation was an important factor in forcing the factions to reevaluate their mutual hostility in terms of Armenian needs. The ARF recognized that, considering the total alienation of West Armenian territories and the threat of assimilation in the Diaspora, Soviet Armenia is a most positive reality. The ADL-Hunchakian bloc recognized, on the other hand, that Soviet Armenia far from embodied the political and territorial aspirations of the Armenian nation. In 1965 joint commemorations of the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide inaugurated an era of partisan rapproche-

ment. A manifestation of the rising spirit of cooperation was the attitude of Armenian organizations toward the recent civil war in Lebanon. During 1975 and 1976 the three Armenian groups agreed on a policy of "positive neutrality," combined their efforts to minimize the inescapable loss of life and property within the Armenian community, and even tried to mediate between the fighting elements.

Since the two segments began to perceive a commonality of interests, links between the Diaspora and Soviet Armenia have multiplied. Soviet Armenian artists, performers, and writers tour the communities abroad. Diaspora Armenians visit Soviet Armenia by the thousands yearly. Groups of teachers, students, and often individual performers are invited to spend time in that country. Through these contacts have emerged not only an appreciation by each of the problems and concerns of the other, but also a realization that some of these problems are common. Furthermore, each has contributed to their solution in its own way. Soviet Armenia's cultural viability has infused fresh blood into a stagnating and disintegrating Diaspora, although to satisfy the masses there and to support the claim that Soviet Armenia is a home for all Armenians, authorities in Moscow and Yerevan have had to make serious concessions to Armenian cultural nationalism.

The improvement in the political climate has also produced a rapprochement between the two Catholicosates. As a gesture of goodwill the Catholicos of All Armenians in Edjmiadsin sent an official delegation to represent him at the election and anointment in May 1977 of a coadjutor Catholicos to the see of Cilicia. Karekin II, now the co-ruler with the ailing Khoren I, had been instrumental as a bishop in promoting a tacit agreement between the two sees on the most crucial issue dividing the Armenian national Church - the elimination from the statute governing the see of Cilicia of those provisions which had allowed extension of its jurisdiction over communities in the Diaspora formerly under Edjmiadsin.

Yet the most characteristic development in Diaspora politics has been the adoption of a united front by the Hunchakian Party, the ARF, and ADL regarding the territorial claims against Turkey. In a memorandum submitted to the United Nations in 1975, and in other related documents, the three demanded "the return of Turkish-held Armenian territories to their rightful owner - the Armenian people." (82) The deliberate vagueness of the formula accommodates differences of opinion beyond the crucial idea itself, provides for any eventuality in future international developments, and yet stresses the fundamental rights of the Armenian people as a nation. The document fails, however, to specify the exact boundaries of historic Armenia, although reference to the Sevres Treaty suggests that these encompass the six eastern provinces of the former Ottoman Empire. (83)

Primarily by peaceful means, Diaspora Armenians have multiplied their efforts on behalf of these claims. They have propagated documentation of the genocide and its effects. They have organized public demonstrations, erected memorial monuments, made anti-

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Turkish propaganda through various publications, and approached the diplomatic missions of various countries and international agencies regarding moral, financial, and above all territorial reparation by the Republic of Turkey. (84) Yet it is altogether clear that if acquisition of a national territory is the national goal, none of these activities provides more than momentary respite. The centuries-old partition of Armenia will not be ended by public opinion drives. No Turkish government will willingly relinquish any part of its territory. No Western power has any interest in placing the Armenian case on the agenda of nations as "unfinished business." The more the rivalry between the superpowers abates, the less the chance that the USSR will challenge the legitimacy of Turkey's frontiers. The frustration growing out of the impasse is largely responsible for the nonpeaceful means adopted by some Armenian groups. During the last few years such groups have claimed responsibility for the assassinations of three Turkish ambassadors and attempts on three others, for the bombings of Turkish government offices in Europe, and two explosions in Istanbul itself. (85)

The territorial nationalism in the Armenian Diaspora is at least partially a reaction against the increasing threat of assimilation. A recent study has shown that even in Lebanon, the state with the highest concentration of Armenians in the Middle East, there has been a detectable erosion in the ethnic orientation of Armenians during the past two decades; (86) and the ethnic orientation has been proven to be highest among those involved in the activities of the political parties. (87) In the unsettled world of the diaspora, nationalism - the vision (however vague) of a territorially integral Armenia - satisfies two basic needs. First, it establishes an immediate link with the past through the most material of the elements of the past - land. Secondly, it offers a mental framework within which Armenians can continue to perceive themselves as Armenians in foreign lands.

While it is true that not all Armenians in the Diaspora share the vision of a united Armenia as a political program, territorial aspirations are sustained, nonetheless, by the deep sense of injustice that Armenians generally feel. Turkey continues to deny the events of the past that caused the formation of a Diaspora; its government has refused to compensate in any way the losses suffered during World War I; and, occasionally, its diplomatic representatives have used their influence with foreign governments to hinder activities by Armenians that might result in an unfavorable world public opinion toward their country. Consistently adhered to by successive Turkish governments, this policy has been more effective in perpetuating Diaspora nationalism among Armenians than any program the political parties could devise.

But this nationalism is also increasingly divorced from the social realities in which Diaspora Armenians presently live. Under these circumstances, those who still carry the burden of the past tend to transform political concepts into abstract, moralistic values; and while the latter can provide a positive frame of identification for a threatened ethnic group, it can hardly bring any changes in the political futures of a dispersed nation and their divided homeland.

## NOTES

- (1) For a comprehensive and detailed view of developments in Armenia between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries, see Ds. P. Aghayan et al., eds., Hay Zhoghovrdi Patmutiun History of the Armenian People (Yerevan, 1967), vol. 4; L. S. Khachikian et al., eds., Hay Zhoghovurde Feodalismi Vayredjki Zhamanakashrdjanum, XIV-XVIII DD The Armenian People during the Period of the Decline of Feudalism, XIV-XVIII centuries (1972); similarly, vol. 5 of the same eight-volume series published by the Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR, Ds. P. Aghayan et al., eds., Hayastane 1801-1870 Tvakannerin Armenia during the years 1801-1870 (1974), provides the most adequate history preceding the rise of modern political nationalism. See also H. Pastermajian, Histoire de l'Armenie depuis les origines jusqu'au Traite de Lausanne (Paris, 1949); A.K. Sanjian, The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion (Cambridge, 1965). For an introduction to the modern era in Armenian history, see R.G. Hovannessian's Armenia on the Road to Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 1-68. The period discussed in this article is covered in S. Atamian's The Armenian Community (New York, 1955), an informative but biased study; and A. Ter Minassian's valuable and concise "La Question Armenienne," Esprit, April 1967, pp. 620-656.
- (2) For the process of Russian expansion into the Caucasus, see W.E.D. Allen and P. Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921 (Cambridge, 1953). See also V. Gregorian, "The Impact of Russia on the Armenians and Armenia," in Russia and Asia, ed. W. S. Vucinich (Stanford, 1972), pp. 167-218.
- (3) See J. Etmekjian, The French Influence on the Western Armenian Renaissance, 1843-1915 (New York, 1964); and A. Abeghian, "The New Literature of the East Armenians," The Armenian Review 3 (1977): 256-264.
- (4) For what came to be known as the Armenian Question, see W. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1920, vol. 1 (New York and London, 1935), pp. 145-166, 195-211, and 321-354; A.O. Sarkissian, History of the Armenian Question to 1885 (Urbana, 1938); A. Beylerian, "L'Imperialisme et le mouvement national armenien," Relations Internationales 3 (1975): 19-54; and G.H. Cloud, "The Armenian Question from the Congress of Berlin to the Massacres, 1878-1894" (M.A. thesis, Stanford University, 1923).
- (5) Political attitudes among the Armenian bourgeoisie are discussed in V. Rshtuni, Hay Hasarakakan Hosankneri Patmutiunits Of the history of Armenian social trends (Yerevan, 1956), pp. 1-374; D. Ananun, Rusahayeri Hasarakakan Zargatsume The social develop-

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- (6) Hay Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutian Dsragir (henceforth HHD Dsragir) Program of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Vienna, n.d.), pp. 17-19; this program was devised during the first General Congress of the party in 1892. M. Varandian's H.H. Dashnaktsutian Patmutiun History of the A(rmenian) R(evolutionary) Federation 2 vols., (Paris, 1932 and Cairo, 1950), still provides the best overview of the ARF's history despite its romanticized approach and polemical style. For an introduction to the early history of the political organizations, see L. Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967). See also J. M. Hagopian's "Hyphenated Nationalism: The Spirit of the Revolutionary Movement in Asia Minor, 1896-1910" (Ph.d. diss., Harvard University, 1943). Many of the following observations are drawn from this writer's doctoral dissertation in progress, "Ideological Developments within the Armenian Liberation Movement, 1885-1908" (University of California at Los Angeles).
- (7) Hunchak (Organ of the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party, Geneva), November (actually December), 1887, p. 1 (my translation). The Hunchakians later adopted the "social democratic" label. For their history, see L. Nalbandian, "The Origins and Development of Socialism in Armenia. The Social Democratic Hunchakian Party 1887-1949" (M.A. thesis, Stanford University, 1949); A. Kitur, ed., Patmutiun S.D. Hunchakian Kusaktsutian 1887 - 1962 History of the S(ocial) D(emocratic) Hunchakian Party 1887-1962 2 vols. (Beirut, 1962-1963). Unfortunately this latter work falls short of fulfilling the promise of its title. 1763
- (8) HHD Dsragir, p. 16.
- (9) Ibid., pp. 19-20; "Dsragir Hunchakian Kusaktsutian" Program of the Hunchakian Party Hisnamiak Sotsial Demokrat Hunchakian Kusaktsutian 1887-1937 (Providence, 1938), pp. 38-39.
- (10) Varandian, H.H. Dashnaktsutian Patmutiun, vol. 1, pp. 468-472.

- (11) This was clearly stated in the first manifesto of the ARF published in 1890; see Divan H.H. Dashnaktsutian Archives of the ARF S. Vratsian, ed., vol. I (Boston, 1934), p. 89.
- (12) M. Hovannisian, Dashnaktsutiune ev nra Hakarakordnere The (AR) Federation and its Adversaries (Tiflis, 1906-7), pp. 54-83.
- (13) For the rise of Marxism among Armenians, see V. A. Avetisian, Hay Hasarakakan Mtki Zargatsman Marks-Leninian Puli Skzbnavorume The beginnings of the Marxist-Leninist phase of the development of Armenian social thought (Yeveran, 1976). This study includes a critique of other Armenian parties from the point of view of Soviet Marxism.
- (14) Hisnamiak, p. 38.
- (15) HHD Dsragir, p. 17.
- (16) Hovannesian, Armenia on the Road, pp. 34-37.
- (17) See Varandian, H.H. Dashnaktsutian Patmutiun, vol. I, pp. 254-264 and G. Sassuni, Kurt Azgayin Sharzhume ev Hay-Krtakan Hara-berutiunnere The Kurdish national movement and Armeno-Kurdish relations (Beirut, 1969), pp. 153-191.
- (18) Droshak Organ of the ARF, Geneva July 1903, pp. 97-98 (my translation).
- (19) H. H. Dashnaktsutian Dsragir Program of the ARF, (Geneva 1907), pp. 18-19.
- (20) Hunchak, August-September 1910, p. 2. The resolution was passed during the Sixth General Congress of the Party held in Constantinople, November 1909.
- (21) For sources on the genocide of the Armenian people, see R.G. Hovannesian's The Armenian Holocaust: A Bibliography Relating to the Deportations, Massacres, and Dispersion of the Armenian People, 1915-1923 (Cambridge, Mass., 1978). There has always been a tendency among some historians to bring the academic view on the Genocide of the Armenians into harmony with the official position held on the subject by the Ottoman and Turkish governments - to deny that a Genocide ever took place, and to blame the victims for whatever tragedy befell them. This tendency has been particularly strong among Western historians since Turkey joined the NATO Alliance. The most recent example of this sort of scholarship is S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw's History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol. II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 (Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne, 1977), esp. pp. 124-127, 188-191, 200-205, 238-247, 262-267, 276-281 and 298-333. For a critical appraisal of the volume, see R. G. Hovannesian, "The Critic's View: Beyond Revisionism," International Journal of Middle East Studies 9, no. 3

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(August 1978): 379-388. The same issue of this journal also offers a response by the authors of the volume to Hovannesian's criticisms in pp. 388-400.

Reasons for the disparity between views held on the subject by Turkish, Western, and Armenian historians are explored in this writer's "Objectivity and Historiography of the Armenian Genocide," The Armenian Review 31, no. 3 (Spring 1978): 86-93.

- (22) For the history of the Armenian and other Caucasian republics, see R.G. Hovannesian, The Republic of Armenia, Vol. I, The First Year, 1918-1919 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971); J.B. Gidney, A Mandate for Armenia (Kent, Ohio, 1967); F. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (New York and Oxford, 1951); and R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (New York, 1968), pp. 7-21, 93-107.
- (23) See R.G. Hovannesian, "Armenia and the Caucasus in the Genesis of the Soviet-Turkish Entente," The Armenian Review 27, no. 1 (Spring 1974): 32-52.
- (24) Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, pp. 193-241. See also A. Capriellian, "The Sovietization of Armenia: A Case History in Imperialism," The Armenian Review 20, no. 3 (Autumn, 1967): 22-42; and S. Vratsian, Hayastani Hanrapetutian Republic of Armenia (Beirut, 1958), pp. 445-507.
- (25) Unless otherwise indicated, statistical information regarding Armenians in the Soviet Union and Soviet Armenia is derived from the latest All-Union Census in the USSR in 1970. As usual, one must approach any statistical information, particularly from the USSR, with caution.
- (26) For a detailed study of the early decades of Soviet Armenia, see M.K. Matossian, The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia (Leiden, 1962).
- (27) J.S. Kirakosian, Hayastane Midjazgayin Divanagitutian ev Sove-takan Artakin Kaghakakanutian Pastateghtherum Armenia in the documents of international diplomacy and Soviet Union foreign policy (Yerevan, 1972), pp. 418-419.
- (28) The background of the conflict is discussed in R.G. Hovannesian, "The Armeno-Azerbaijani Conflict Over Mountainous Karabagh, 1918-1919," The Armenian Review 24, no. 2 (Summer 1971): 3-39. See also A.H. Arslanian, "Britain and the Question of Mountainous Karabagh," paper presented at the Eleventh Annual Meeting of MESA, Los Angeles, 1977.
- (29) S. Vratsian, Republic of Armenia, pp. 524-568. In Soviet Armenian historiography the event is known as the "February adventure" and presented as the attempt of a power-hungry ARF to regain control of the government. See, for example, Ds. P. Aghayan et al., eds., Hay Zoghovrdi Patmutiun 7 (Yerevan, 1967): 136-154.

- (30) G. Lazian, Hayastan ev Hay Date - Vaveragrer, Armenia and the Armenian Case -- Documents (Cairo, 1946), p. 306. The same document is discussed in conjunction with the New Economic Policy in Hay Zoghovrdi Patmutiun, vol. 7, p. 176.
- (31) The great purges in Soviet Armenia between 1936 and 1939 are covered with much detail in A. Atan's "Sovetahay Kiank" Soviet Armenian Life monthly chronicle in Hairenik Amsagir (Boston, an ARF monthly review) throughout the same period. For an eyewitness account, see A. Haroot, "The Purges in Soviet Armenia," The Armenian Review 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1951): 133-139.
- (32) Lazian, Vaveragrer, pp. 346-350. See also S. Torosian, "Soviet Policy in the Armenian Question," The Armenian Review 11, no. 2 (Summer 1958): 27-39.
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- (36) For these and other comparisons see B.D. Silver, "Levels of Socioeconomic Development Among Soviet Nationalities," American Political Science Review 68 (1974): 1618-1637.
- (37) See M.K. Matossian, "Communist Rule and the Changing Armenian Cultural Pattern," in E. Goldhagen, ed., Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union (New York, 1968), pp. 185-197.
- (38) V.E. Khodjabekian, "HSSH Bnakchutiune, Erek, Aysor ev Vaghe" The population of the A(rmenian) S(oviet) S(ocialist) R(epublic) yesterday, today and tomorrow, Lraber (Yerevan), no. 12 (1972), p. 53.
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- (40) L.V. Chuiko, Braki i razvodi (Moscow, 1976), p. 76.
- (41) Khodjabekian, "HSSH Bnakchutiune," p. 48.
- (42) L. Davtian, "Amusnanal: Erb. Erekaner unenal: Kani" To Marry: When? To Bear Children: How Many?, Garun Amsagir, no. 10 (1971), pp. 73-77.
- (43) Khodjabekian, "HSSH Bnakchutiune," p. 53.
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