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"UNCERTAINTY AND INSECURITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS"

GERARD J. LIBARIDIAN

PARADOXES

- **Breakdown of USSR and Yugoslavia into states while the rest of the world was moving toward regionalization and globalization.**
 - Duality in new states as one manifestation of paradox: While these new states rewrite history and nationalize their cultures—a natural corollary of their liberation from Soviet domination—in their foreign policy they strive toward membership in regional and international organizations.

- **Nation/State building, while nation-state is under attack from three sources:**
 - From the top, **US as superpower** under Clinton to some extent but certainly in a less inhibited way under Bush, rewriting the definition of state sovereignty; general review of **interventionism**
 - From below, **non-state peoples/secessionists** as non-recognized states that defy and expose the weaknesses of the nation-state concept
 - From the middle, **international organizations**, such as the WB, IMF, OSCE and WTO, compelling states to accept norms and standards in processes of political democratization and economic liberalization. There has been **no conceptual reconciliation** between international standards and local structures, habits, traditions and traditional structures except the determination that democracy and a state of law will take longer than expected, meanwhile accepting non-democratic regimes.

- While on the level of non-conventional weapons negotiations the major countries tend to find means to cooperate and establish norms of international behavior, a **mini Cold War** had survived on other issues and was projected strongly in the regions of concern to us here. The vagueries in US policies and its unilateralism have created uncertainties which the weakened governments of the South Caucasus are unable to cope with.
 - More often than not the new states had continued to **look outward** for the solution of their problems rather than taking full responsibility for their decisions and policies; if it is not Moscow, it is Washington or Brussels.
 - That process has been encouraged by the **over-strategization** of the south Caucasus with consequences which are yet to be fully appreciated.

- The Post-Soviet **framework for conflict resolution** (supremacy of the principle of territorial integrity in return for self-government for secessionists within states that are democratized and economically liberalized states) has failed but it has **not been replaced** by any new framework.

The US and regional powers claim **peace as their goal** in regional conflicts, they are not ready to accept a peace that might diminish their influence. Keeping conflicts frozen provides, at the least, an opportunity to prevent the other side from imposing

its own peace, hence the **reluctance** to use international pressure on parties to conflicts, while the passage of time **legitimizes the hardened/nationalist positions** of parties to conflicts, making it more difficult to accept compromises.

- The US policy of using the term **war against international terrorism** for any and all of its actions, in fact the superimposition of that war over all other considerations has led to the support of regimes which, as during the Cold War period anti-Communist crusade. Furthermore, Anti-Terrorism is **not a principle of world organization**. Elevated to that level, it becomes difficult to translate into country or region-specific policy without endangering other foreign policy goals. At the end, it appears as a means to compel other states to accept the US agenda and justifies support for non-democratic regimes that support US policies, alienating long time allies that, at the end, care more about democracy and peace.
- The major powers have been **unable to agree on a new world order** that would help the new states feel comfortable with their new security environment and focus on domestic political and economic development. The interaction between domestic and foreign/security policies in these new states is far more consequential in most new states. The **uncertainties in these regions regarding their security framework** within the elites is more disconcerting and destabilizing than has been recognized.
- What major powers don't do is as important as what they do; what they are, or how they are perceived is, possibly, the more destabilizing.
- The uncertain environment, made more acute by the limits on American power shown through the Iraq experience, has made the security thinking—particularly as they relate to domestic policies-- in these regions less predictable and less amenable to behavior conducive to international expectations.